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Purpose – In 2016 the Polish government launched the Family 500+ program. This family policy 
instrument is regarded as a unique but debatable measure. The paper assesses the program in terms of 
interdisciplinary relationships between public programs, politics, sociology and demography. 
Research method – The research for the paper was carried out using a qualitative case study-based 
method. A critical analysis of the relevant legislation, public policy assumptions, reports, and earlier 
studies was performed. The data contained in the Demographic Yearbook of Poland [2018, 2019, 2020] 
published by Statistics Poland and simple methods of descriptive statistics were also used. 
Results – The conclusions from the research are that while the program’s effect on the demographic 
situation in Poland is limited, it helps reduce poverty, supports families and politically benefits the 
ruling party. They also suggest that the current sociological, social, cultural, historical, and political 
factors have an essential influence on how this type of programs is received by voters and on their 
success. 
Originality / value / implications / recommendations – The program has prevented the demographic gap 
in Poland from widening. A new study using simulation modelling will seek to determine whether it 
also reduces poverty among families with children. The program’s demographic effectiveness and its 
effect on the female labor market should be further studied in the future. 
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Social welfare programs are one of the more important instruments used to 
complement the redistributive function of the state and public finances. At the same 
time, however, the large-scale social and welfare projects aimed at specific groups 
of beneficiaries invariably lead to heated debates and a dissonance of opinions. 
                              
1 Article received on 30 May 2021, accepted on 26 July 2021. 
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The reason why researchers, practitioners, and politicians vary significantly in their 
conclusions regarding this type of policies and measures is the use of explicitly 
economic, social, political, etc. criteria, which are hardly reconcilable. The Family 
500+ program that the government formed by the Law and Justice party introduced 
in 2016 to improve the demographic situation in the country and families’ welfare 
was promoted as a unique solution and has the status of a feather in the govern-
ment’s cap. The program itself and its effects are highly debatable. Inevitably, it has 
had distinct political coloring since it was launched. 
The added value of using qualitative analysis to assess economic, social and 
welfare programs run by public authorities is that it enables the identification of 
social, psychological, and political factors involved and the description of inter-
disciplinary relationships in the triangle of public finances, politics, and sociology. 
This study examines public discussions of the Family 500+ program and its general 
assessments in the wider context of the effectiveness of welfare programs and 
political and sociological factors. One of the more controversial aspects of social 
programs is the form of assistance (monetary or in-kind) and the use of potential 
beneficiaries’ financial and wealth status to determine their eligibility. Although the 
Family 500+ program drew criticism from many experts and opposition politicians, 
it has been effective in winning wide public support for its creators. An interesting 
question is, therefore, what factors contribute to the popularity of the program and 
firm support for the ruling party when even its authors have admitted that it has 
failed to significantly improve the demographic situation. In the early 2020 the 
government representatives acknowledged for the first time that the program had 
not increased the number of births and was not likely to increase it in the future 
[www 1]. This leads to yet another question about how to assess the effectiveness of 
demographic, social, and educational programs run by the public authorities? 
To what extent does it depend on the sociological and historical factors and the 
specifics of the country? These questions are important in mature democracies 
where the rule of economic law coexists with the welfare doctrine emphasizing 
social needs and citizens’ preferences. 
This study has shown that the introduction of the Family 500+ program was 
well-timed and harmonized with the prevalent social moods. Its political context as 
well as the need to empower and restore dignity to social groups that did not benefit 
from the transition processes in Poland after 1989 were also important. 
 
 
2. Methodological approach  
 
The performance of the Family 500+ program was assessed using a qualitative 
case-study-based method and simple methods of descriptive statistics. The critical 
analysis of pertinent legislation, public policy objectives, reports, and earlier studies 
was performed. The majority of statistics in this paper were sourced from the 
Demographic Yearbook of Poland [2018, 2019, 2020] published by Statistics Poland to 
present the number and structure of births and the demographic structure in 
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Poland. The objectives of the Family 500+ program, the key themes in the public 
debate, and the program’s early effects are examined from the triple perspective of 
public finances, politics, and sociology. The timing of the program, the country’s 
characteristics, and the psychological factors are also analyzed. This type of analysis 
involved the use of a qualitative analysis rather than a quantitative one, as the latter 
tends to produce inconsistent results. 
 
 
3. Literature review 
 
Researchers have long been pointing to the relationships between economic, 
political and administrative sciences. Investigations into the influence of political 
factors on the economy and public finances have become an almost classical strand 
of research known as the new political economy. With the deepening realization of 
the role of sociological and even psychological factors in the economy, a new strand 
of financial research called behavioral finance has emerged.  
Demography, too, critically determines contemporary socio-economic policy, 
also in the broader sense of sustainable development and public health [Bloom et 
al., 2003; Grundy, Murphy, 2015, pp. 718-735; www 4]. By allowing for demography 
and globalization, it is possible to better understand the worldwide economic 
processes, as well as differences in how national economies develop and change 
[Hulme, 2005, pp. 417-425]. A special challenge that many countries are currently 
faced with is the aging of their populations and ethnic or racial diversity problems 
[Bloom, Luca, 2016; www 3]. All the problems have global as well as regional conse-
quences [www 2]. It has also been known for quite a time that the assessment of 
social programs in welfare states is problematic, one methodological problem being, 
for instance, exogenous variations [Moffitt, 1989, pp. 237-250]. Chinese scientists 
have observed that, although sociology and political and administrative sciences are 
treated as separate disciplines these days, they are all rooted in philosophical 
sciences, and all center around studying human activity and nature, society, culture, 
and the practical aspects of the functioning of state institutions and societies 
[Chanthamith et al., 2019, p. 353]. With the inclusion of the sociological perspective 
in administrative science and public management science, their scope has been 
extended to social and anthropological analysis. Sociology studies individuals against 
the background of interactions taking place in political and institutional-organiza-
tional environments. “Sociology is the equivalent of a “catalyst” or “stepper” for 
public administration. Sociology takes “the social man” as a premise of the human 
nature hypothesis, emphasizing the cultural function and social structure, explaining 
the individual’s self-consciousness, identity and role playing, and considering the 
complexity of various behaviors in social activities” [Chanthamith et al., 2019, 
pp. 355-356]. According to these authors: “Political science provides a meta theory 
and method for the theory and practice of public management, which can guarantee 
the core value orientation of the development of public management theory and 
practice, and at the same time, the research of the theory and practice of public 
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administration is positioned in the direction of public interest as the core orien-
tation, so as to prevent the corresponding value”. 
Therefore, sociology can offer a new perspective, theories, research methods and 
inspiration to political, public finance and administrative sciences. This role is 
important as economists in representative democracies have a problem deciding 
which redistribution channel is the most suitable for delivering particular social 
services and goods. Whether redistribution should take place between citizens or 
rather between local communities is also an issue [Stiglitz, 2000, pp. 880-900]. 
According to the existing literature, governments can redistribute wealth through 
cash transfers to citizens (benefits, pensions, scholarships, etc.) and/or by delivering 
concrete goods and services by means of the public sector. There is also the 
question about the ratio between the state and market mechanisms in the economy 
[Landsburg, Feinstone, 1997, p. 149]. Cash transfers tend to be used less often today 
on account of problems with defining who the beneficiaries should be and with 
monitoring their spending. Social programs in developed and developing countries 
differ in their scope, objectives, and the types of benefits offered. In developing 
countries, they play a vital role as a means of reducing poverty and crime rates but 
show a strong dependence on the character of the political regime. In developed 
countries, the decisions on public finances are markedly influenced by political 
budget cycles [Dodlova et al., 2017; Dodlova et al., 2018]. 
The use of cash and in-kind transfer schemes is by no means limited to deve-
loping countries. A. Aizer et al. [2014] have estimated that in the USA more than 
one in five children is affected by poverty. After analyzing the cash assistance 
programs such as the Mothers’ Pension ran between 1911 and 1935 in terms of their 
effect on children’s life expectancy, they concluded that they extended it by one year 
on average. Despite the lack of wider empirical studies of in-kind assistance 
programs conducted in recent years, it is believed that they can be a valuable 
supplement to tax systems and make the scarcity of borrowing options, imperfect 
agent information, and the labor market problems easier to bear, thus contributing 
to the establishment of a fairer and more effective system of social transfers [see: 
Currie, Gahvari, 2008]. In-kind transfers cannot be used by beneficiaries as freely as 
cash benefits, but both instruments are an element of the welfare role and function 
of the state. Their short-term effects can be different from long-term ones, and their 
performance depends on the circumstances and the situation in the country. 
The social effects and effectiveness of both approaches are difficult to measure 
empirically because of the limited availability of the data on their users. 
The role of the public sector is to provide society and particular social groups 
with services in quantity and quality appropriate for their needs. The needs and 
preferences of the public are difficult to measure and analyze. The Polish experience 
provides evidence, however, that scientific and professional analysis of citizens’ 
preferences is not always necessary for social programs to be perceived by the public 
as attractive and welcome. In Poland, it was rather a good understanding of political 
moods and public expectations, the use of subtle national, historical, and class 
arguments invoking national pride (outside the country) and the feeling of exclusion 
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(inside) that worked. The transition to a market economy caused more inequalities 
in the country and many social groups found themselves unable to cope with the 
new social and economic reality. Their feeling of abandonment was strengthened by 
comparisons with social elites reaping the fruits of political and economic 
transformation. The decision of the Law and Justice Party and its leader to appeal to 
people who had low incomes, few assets, and felt excluded showed that they aptly 
recognized the feelings of people living in small and medium-sized towns and rural 
areas. E. Wnuk-Lipiński [2008, p. 65] used in his book the term ‘relative deprivation’ 
to describe a state in which the experience of social disadvantaged ness and the 
inaccessibility of some goods is more painful when people compare their situation 
with some reference group, e.g. with people living in other parts of the city, the resi-
dents of large cities, other social groups, or the new or old elites. Elites are perceived 
as a social group that has too much control and access to different types of tangible 
and intangible goods. In many cases, the scope of the redistribution function of 
public finance is decided by elites. Studies on elites are frequently equated with in-
vestigations into power structures and social inequalities [Khan, 2012, pp. 361-377].  
In both theory and practice, the problems with evaluating public programs 
pursuing demographic and social goals are emphasized. In the case of demographic 
policy, its long-term goals, the characteristics and aspirations of the young 
generation in the existing historical and economic circumstances are especially 
important. Because public programs are frequently influenced by a wide range of 
circumstances, it is sometimes difficult to tell exactly what needs they address, as it 
happened in Poland where the authors of the Family 500+ program initially empha-
sized its demographic goals but in time turned the spotlight on its advantages as an 
instrument improving families’ well-being and social stability. A.H. Gauthier [2001, 
pp. 1-45] has noted that public policy significantly shapes the situation of families 
and the country’s demography. Her analysis of public programs and social policies 
made from a broad sociological perspective has shown that they influence the lives 
of families by determining their chances and limitations. Having examined the effect 
of demographic programs on fertility, family structure, and the labor force partici-
pation of mothers, Gauthier concluded that the effect was complex, related to the 
specifics of the country, and hard to measure. Earlier studies have shown that it may 
also depend on the prevailing family model, women’s aspirations, and the strength 
of Catholicism in the country [Chesnais, 1996, p. 729].  
Demographic programs are long-term, which contributes to the fact that imple-
menting them and measuring their performance is difficult. A group of Swedish 
researchers has looked at how a family policy shapes women’s decisions to have first 
and second children [Billingsley et al., 2018], which are made on a case-by-case basis. 
The decision to have a first child is usually made out of a sheer desire to have an 
offspring, but later decisions are more dependent on the government family policy 
and, quite frequently, on the parents’ wealth and level of education. The researchers 
distinguished between investment-oriented family policies and traditional, prote-
ction-oriented family policies. They concluded that the higher support through both 
types of family policy was correlated with the postponement of first births, and that 
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the considerations for postponement might be different. The greater support from 
investment-oriented policies (earner-carer support) was positively correlated with 
second births [Billingsley et al., 2018, pp. 26-28].  
One of the first reports which assessed the “Family 500+” program concluded 
with the following findings [Magda et al., 2019]:  
– the program was to improve the financial standing of families and to 
increase the number of births; while it did manage to reduce the level of 
poverty among families with children in the three years it had been in use, 
the same result could have been achieved at a much lower cost. Further-
more, an increase in the number of births in 2017 and a decrease in 2018 
cannot be attributed to the operation of the program. Therefore, the eco-
nomic effectiveness of the program is very low compared to its outcomes; 
– the program is not a part of the wider family policy and lacks a coherent 
vision of goals, premises, and strategies of action; 
– the labor market effect of the program is negative – it has reduced the labor 
market activity, especially of women; 
– because only some families are eligible for the benefits, the situation of the 
other households (single parents, low-income working parents with one 
child, parents of children with disabilities) deteriorated in relative terms; 
– the program uses funds that could be spent on projects that would be more 
beneficial for the general public (education, health care) or for the overall 
development prospects of the country (public infrastructure, including tran-
sport, air quality, etc.). 
The “Family 500+” program has enabled many families to improve their living 
standard, but there is nothing to suggest that it has already contributed to a sig-
nificant and permanent increase in fertility rates. The program’s limited effectiveness 
coincides with other problems, such as the ambiguity of the financial support system 
for families and the existence of three equivalent measures (tax reliefs, family 
allowances, and the 500+ benefit) at the same time. The issue of impact on poverty 
is very complicated and debatable [see: Myck et al., 2019, pp. 1-23].  
The demographic situation and trends are important not only for public health, 
healthcare availability, and social structures, but also for the economy, labor market, 
and the sustainability of development. Therefore, the analysis of the “Family 500+” 
program must also consider the current demographic situation in the country and 
the number of women of childbearing age, which has drastically decreased.  
 
 
4. Research and results 
 
4.1 The legislative and political background of the Family 500+ Program 
 
The Family 500+ program has been a politically contentious issue since it was 
promised by the Law and Justice party during the election campaign in 2015. 
Opposition politicians, mainly the Civic Platform, criticized its authors of tantalizing 
Beata Guziejewska 36 
voters with projects that were infeasible for a number of reasons, not least because 
of budget constraints. Nevertheless, the new Sejm dominated by the Law and 
Justice party passed on February 11, 2016, a statute establishing the Family 500+ 
program, a form of state support for persons raising children under 18 years of age. 
Contrary to the original promise that each child in Poland would receive a tax-free 
benefit of PLN 500, the statute excluded firstborn children in families with per 
capita income exceeding PLN 800, or 1200 PLN, if the child had disabilities, until 
2019. One of the more important amendments to the statute that became effective 
on July 1, 2019, revoked the income criterion and thereby extended support also to 
firstborn children [Act, 2019]. 
In the statute, a child-raising benefit is defined as a partial reimbursement of 
costs involved in a raising a child, including expenses necessary to provide care to 
a child and meet his or her life needs. The persons eligible to receive benefits are:  
– the mother or the father if the child lives with and is maintained by them 
(where child care is split between them, each parent is entitled to half of the 
benefit), or 
– the actual guardian of the child if the child lives with and is maintained by 
the guardian, or 
– the legal guardian of the child, or 
– the director of the residential care home who has custody over the child. 
The Ministry of Family and Social Policy [www 5] emphasizes that the Family 
500+ program is an investment in Polish families and that it has already encouraged 
childbearing (the national fertility rate increased between 2015 and 2017 from 1.29 
to 1.45) and has lifted families from poverty, particularly families with children (the 
extreme poverty rate decreased between 2015 and 2017 from 6.5 to 4.3%). The 
amended version of the program raises the living standard of all Polish families with 
dependent children and enhances the government policy for families. To prove the 
program’s effectiveness and raise its ratings, the government uses data from diffe-
rent years. The analysis of the demographic data presented below leads to somewhat 
different conclusions, pointing out that they should be viewed from a broader and 
long-term perspective rather than selected to promote specific conclusions. 
The first opinions on the program were presented in the mass media and had 
distinctly political overtones. The program was criticized for a ‘carefree distribution’ 
of public funds as it ignored the potential beneficiaries’ income status as well as the 
budgetary constraints. The members of the previous government formed by the 
coalition of the Civic Platform and the Polish People’s Party that lost power in 
November 2015 claimed that the program was a pork-barrel project unaffordable 
for the state. It also drew criticism for concentrating on financial support for Polish 
families while ignoring other vital needs, such as greater availability of nurseries and 
kindergartens. The opponents of the program also pointed to its potentially adverse 
impact on employment among women and their labor market status. 
It is fair to note, however, that even broad comparisons showed that before 
2015, Poland’s expenditure on cash family benefits was much below the EU 
average. In 2014, for instance, Poland and the EU allocated to them an average of 
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0.8 and 1.6% of their respective GDPs. The introduction of the Family 500+ 
program increased the rate to 1.85% of Poland’s GDP, with the total expenditure 
on family benefits rising from 1.59% in 2015 to 2.6% in 2016 [Hagemejer, 2017 pp. 
4-5]. Even if we factor out different wealth levels in Poland and the EU, the Polish 
rates were significantly lower than the EU averages. The authors of one of the first 
studies evaluating the effects of the Family 500+ program established that it had 
improved the financial situation of Polish families, particularly of families with more 
than two children and those living in rural areas and small towns and had slightly 
increased the number of births in the better educated and better-off families. 
However, they also observed that it was likely to have a negative influence on 
employment among women [Golinowska, Sowa-Kofta, 2017, pp. 7-12]. The results 
of other research indicated that even though the program had a positive effect on 
families’ incomes and redistribution of wealth in the short term, its long-term 
consequences could be expected to be negative [Brzeziński, Najsztub, 2017, pp. 16-
24]. The program’s demographic effectiveness, costs-benefits analyses and especially 
its effect on the female labor market in the future, should be considered by 
economists.   
Contrary to the experts’ and demographers’ opinions, the government repre-
sentatives consistently claimed until the end of 2019 that the program helped 
improve the demographic situation in Poland. It was only in early 2020 that they 
admitted that it did not contribute to the noticeably higher birth rates and that it 
should rather be considered in terms of the question of how bad the demographic 
situation would be had it not been implemented. 
 
4.2. Analysis of selected descriptive demographic statistics and Poland’s 
demographic situation 
 
Because of the relatively short length of time since the initiation of the Family 
500+ program, the evaluation of its demographic effects must be very tentative. It is 
also important to remember that, as has already been mentioned, the short-term and 
long-term effects of such programs need to be considered taking account of the 
specifics of the country and the current demographic situation. In Poland, the 2018 
populations of women aged 20-24 years, 25-29 years, and 30-34 years were esti-
mated at 1,035,200, 1,275,400 and 1,490,400, respectively. Women born during the 
baby bust will soon reach peak fertility age – data published by Statistics Poland 
show that in the same year the populations of girls aged 18-19 years and 15-17 years 
totaled 368,300 and 521,400, respectively [Demographic Yearbook …, 2019, p. 139].  
Table 1 shows births in Poland in the selected years. Between 2016 and 2017 
their number slightly increased but then it declined in 2018 and 2019. For the sake 
of comparison, the numbers of women aged 25-29 and 30-34 years fell respectively 
to 1,317,700 and 1,546,300 in 2017 and to 1,275,400 and 1,490,400 in 2018. In the 
years after 2000, a considerable increase was recorded in the number of illegitimate 
births, but total births did not follow any specific trend. 
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TABLE 1  
Births 
Year Total 






births as % 
of total live 
births 
Total Legitimate Illegitimate 
2000 380,476 378,348 332,451 45,897 99.4 12.1 
2010 415,030 413,300 328,215 85,086 99.6 20.6 
2016 383,404 382,257 286,704 95,553 99.7 25.0 
2017 403,083 401,982 305,115 96,867 99.7 24.1 
2018 389,455 388,178 285,594 102,584 99.7 26.4 
2019 376,192 374,954 279,791 95,163 99.7 25.4 
Source: [Demographic Yearbook …, 2018, 2019, 2020]. 
 
One of the more interesting aspects in evaluating the effects of the Family 500+ 
program is the occurrence of second and later births that, unlike the majority of first 
children that are born because their parents simply want to have offspring, can be 
attributed to the motivating role of social programs. In table 2, total live births and 
births by order in the selected years are shown. Unfortunately, the unavailability of 
the 2018 birth order data prevented a deeper evaluation of the program. In 2019, 
the number of births decreased.  
 
TABLE 2  
Live births by birth order 
Year Total 
Birth order 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2000 378,348 189014 114843 46533 18865 8400 4330 
2010 413,300 207124 145256 41064 11989 4274 1789 
2016 382,257 175888 146967 42524 10735 3589 1353 
2017 401,982 172642 161272 49965 11896 3780 1387 
2018 388,178 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2019 374,954 160077 134014 57630 16255 4274 1238 
Total % 
2000 100.0 47.8 30.4 12.3 5.0 2.2 1.1 
2010 100.0 50.1 35.1 9.9 2.9 1.0 0.4 
2016 100.0 46.0 38.4 11.1 2.8 0.9 0.4 
2017 100.0 42.0 40.1 12.4 3.0 0.9 0.3 
2018 100.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2019 100.0 42.7 35.7 15.4 4.3 1.3 0.3 
The seventh and later births have been omitted. 
Source: own elaboration based on: [Demographic Yearbook …, 2018, 2019, 2020]. 
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The small increases in the numbers of second and third-order births in 2017 
(table 2) lend some credibility to the claims that the program may have encouraged 
parents to have more children. Even so, the share of first births, although slightly 
smaller, continued to be the largest, meaning that the program’s effects were rather 
unspectacular (for the reasons mentioned above). 
Another element that needs to be considered is the age at which women have 
children, as it determines their further professional careers. According to the data of 
Demographic Yearbook of Poland [2019, 2020], the highest fertility rates occur among 
women aged 25-29 and 30-34 years. Fertility rates for urban and rural areas are 
marginally different and show that urban women tend to have first children at 
a slightly older age. The 2017 and 2018 fertility rates imply a slightly greater effecti-
veness of the program in rural areas than in towns and cities where most Poles live. 
From the sociological standpoint, women living in big cities can have different 
aspirations and goals than those living in rural areas and small towns. For young 
women living in cities their professional careers are important, so they are more 
probable to postpone family formation decisions. It can also be assumed that the 
urban family model is less traditional. It is, therefore, necessary for social programs 
addressing demographic issues to contain instruments improving access to public 
nurseries and kindergartens, protecting women returning from maternity leave, 
promoting flexible forms of employment, and supporting mothers in the labor 
market. Not only financial but also the non-financial means of support are impor-
tant. 
The natural increase data in table 3, reveal differences between urban and rural 
areas. The Polish countryside is characterized by higher natural increase and lower 
emigration rates that influence its total population growth rates. The national natural 
increase rate slightly improved in the years 2016-2017, but in 2019 its value was 
lower again. 
 
TABLE 3  
Population balance 
Years 
Actual increase in thousands 
Population 
as of  
Dec. 31 Total 










-96.8 -26.1 1,793.6 1,819.7 -70.7 x -70.7 38,157.1 
2006-
2010 
43.0 117.8 2,007.5 1,889.7 -74.8 x -74.8 38,529.9 
2011-
2015 
-92.6 -30.2 1,888.8 1,919.0 -62.4 x -62.4 38,436.2 
2015… -41.4 -25.6 369.3 394.9 -15.8 x -15.8 38,437.2 
2016… -4.2 -5.8 382.3 388.0 1.5 x 1.5 38,433.0 
2017… 0.6 -0.9 402.0 402.0 1.4 x 1.4 38,433.6 
2018… -22.4 -26.0 388.2 414.2 3.6 x 3.6 38,411.1 
2019… -28.6 -34.8 375.0 409.7 6.1 x 6.1 38,382.6 




-247.4 -62.5 1018.9 1081.4 -184.9 -128.7 -56.2 23,423.7 
2006-
2010 
-226.3 36.7 1173.3 1136.6 -263.0 -208.9 -54.1 23,429.1 
2011-
2015 
-279.9 -67.1 1098.2 1165.4 -212.8 -166.1 -46.6 23,166.4 
2015… -60.7 -24.7 217.4 242.1 -36.0 -24.1 -11.9 23,166.4 
2016… -34.8 -10.5 226.3 236.7 -24.3 -25.0 0.7 23,129.5 
2017… -36.4 -11.2 236.1 247.3 -25.2 -25.9 0.7 23,109.3 
2018… -52.6 -26.6 228.7 255.3 -26.1 -28.3 2.2 23,067.2 




150.7 36.4 774.7 738.3 114.3 128.7 -14.4 14,733.4 
2006-
2010 
269.3 81.1 834.2 753.1 188.2 208.9 -20.7 15,100.8 
2011-
2015 
187.3 36.9 790.4 753.7 150.3 166.1 15.7 15,270.8 
2015… 19.3 -0.9 151.9 152.9 20.2 24.1 -3.8 15,270.8 
2016… 30.5 4.7 156.0 151.3 25.8 25.0 0.8 15,303.5 
2017… 37.0 10.3 165.8 155.5 16.6 25.9 0.8 15,324.3 
2018… 30.2 0.5 159.5 158.9 29.7 28.3 1.4 15,343.9 
2019… 29.7 -1.8 154.7 156.5 31.6 29.4 2.2 15,349.5 
Source: own elaboration based on [Demographic Yearbook …, 2019, pp. 80-81; Demographic 
Yearbook …, 2020, pp. 80-81]. 
  
The introduction of the Family 500+ program has not made the population 
balance in Poland look more optimistic, but a more categorical evaluation of its 
outcomes should be postponed for several years. It is a prudent approach given that 
the demographic situation has changed to some extent after the program was 
launched, that it is highly rated by the public, and that it has been operating for 
a relatively short period of time (in demographic terms). 
The Ministry of Family and Social Policy2 view the Family 500+ program as the 
key element of financial support for families. According to the Ministry’s estimates, 
in 2019, the extended program was to consume approx. PLN 31bn of taxpayers’ 
money and to benefit around 6.8 million children. Its cost in the next years was 
estimated at about PLN 41bn annually. Therefore, the Family 500+ program is 
a welfare project in addition to pursuing demographic goals, which contradicts the 
ruling party’s early declarations that it was intended to increase the number of births 
in the country. Even though the total fertility rate rose from 1.289 in 2015 to 1.435 
in 2018 and 1.42 in 2019, the goal has not been achieved, and the differences 
between annual fertility rates do not show any specific pattern (the minimum value 
of the fertility rate for generational replacement is 2.10). The long term distribution 
                              
2 Until October 7, 2020 Ministry of  Labour, Family and Social Policy. 
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of first-, second-, and later births should be analyzed more thoroughly. The current 
decline in the number of women of childbearing age is due to the agingof women 
born during the baby boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This is a natural 
demographic process that cannot be changed overnight. It also explains why the 
number of births has not increased considerably in Poland and why the demo-
graphic gap is the largest after World War II. A simple comparison of the number of 
births between 2016 and 2019 is insufficient to conclude about the effectiveness of 
government programs, particularly because the number of women of childbearing 





The introduction of the Family 500+ in Poland was a response to the feeling of 
exclusion experienced by social groups rejected by economic transition after 1990 
and the public’s reluctance, or even resentment, towards the elites (the judiciary 
were called caste and the opposition party was labelled as the party of the elites). 
From a broader perspective, it can also be seen as an effort to empower and restore 
dignity to the local-income social groups, particularly families with children. The 
employment of social factors in politics will certainly be studied further by political 
scientists in the future. In the meantime, attempts are being made to assess the 
short-term effects of this particular social technology and of the Family 500+ 
program in political and demographic terms. The significance of sociological and 
psychological considerations in designing this type of programs is well illustrated by 
the high ratings of the Polish program and public opinion polls consistently indi-
cating strong support for the ruling party. As it appears, when it comes to evaluating 
the program, emotions override its actual demographic effects, which are not very 
impressive, as the data show. 
While the size of Poland’s population has basically been the same for years, it is 
progressively aging and life expectancy in the country is increasing. Both these 
phenomena and the recent COVID-19 pandemic will create more challenges for 
public authorities to deal with in the future. There is a growing indication that the 
solutions to the looming problems will be even more determined by the combi-
nation of public funds, sociology, and politics. Sociologists believe that while the 
exact nature of social changes following the pandemic and the time of lockdowns 
cannot be predicted, they are certain to come. It can also be assumed that many 
future decisions on the economy, public finances, social transfers, and welfare will 
have a political context. If the economic problems necessitate cuts to the Family 
500+ program, the role of political and sociological considerations may even 
increase. What makes the future course of the program interesting to watch is the 
fact that it is one of the largest cash assistance projects in the world. The program 
itself and its effects are highly debatable, as the demographic data show. The main 
and substantive goals of the program were not achieved. It will certainly be analyzed 
and cited as an example in the studies to come. 
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The Family 500+ program has prevented the demographic gap in Poland from 
widening, as shown by general statistics only. A new (future) study using simulation 
modelling will seek to determine whether it also reduces poverty among families 
with children. The program’s demographic effectiveness and its effect on the female 
labor market should be further studied in the future. Because of the short length of 
time it has been operating, trying to judge its outcomes now would be premature in 
many cases, especially that its very nature imposes the adoption of a long-term 
perspective. Therefore, this study was aimed to give a broader context to the 
research problem under consideration. It will be followed by a more detailed ana-
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